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Comments
Tortious Breach Of The Covenant Of
Good Faith And Fair Dealing Since
Foley: Opportunity Or Efficiency
California courts have allowed the recovery of tort damages for
the breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in contracts. A consistent and objective criteria has never been of-fered to determine the contracts for which these damages are re-
coverable. This Comment evaluates the present case law in Cali-fornia and presents objective and workable criteria, consistent with
prior decisions, which focus on delayed performance as the deter-
mining factor in awarding tort damages for the breach of a cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing.
I. INTRODUCTION
People create new duties for themselves daily. These duties are not
imposed by law, social mores, or even individual morality. They are
produced by agreements called contracts. Since the duties imposed
by contract are the product of consent, the damages for breach are
limited by that same consent. These limitations take several forms.
First, contract damages are limited by foreseeability since a person
could not consent to damages she could not foresee.1 Second, con-
1. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3300 (West
1979 & Supp. 1988).
tract damages are also limited for mental suffering.' Like foresee-
ability, a person is only held liable for mental suffering in those con-
tracts where mental suffering would be expected in the event of
breach. Finally, the most settled limitation is that punitive or exem-
plary damages are not available in a contract action.3
There is one exception to each of these limitations to contract
damages. Extended consequences, mental suffering, and punitive
damages are allowable, where the breach of a contract is also a tort.4
One type of breach which the courts have recognized as being both a
breach of contract and a tort is the breach of the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing. 5 California first recognized this tortious
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in insurance
contracts.6 The California Supreme Court stated that every insur-
ance contract contained a covenant of good faith and fair dealing.7 It
held that this implied covenant was not imposed by consent, but by
law. Therefore, the damages were not limited by the parties' consent,
but were governed by law, allowing tort remedies.8 Courts then ex-
tended this implied covenant into the employment9 and banking'0
contexts.
In 1984 the California Supreme Court stated that a tortious
breach could occur in a commercial contract where the breaching
party denied, in bad faith, the existence of a valid contract in Sea-
man's Direct Buying Service Inc. v. Standard Oil Co." While the
Seaman's decision was not based upon the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, it extended the possibility of tortious damages for
the breach of a purely commercial contract. 2
Since Seaman's, courts and scholars have frequently discussed
how far the decision could extend; seldom has anyone agreed. Some
courts have been reluctant to extend the concept of tortious breach.'
3
2. Wynn v. Monterey Club, II1 Cal. App. 3d 789, 801, 168 Cal. Rptr. 878, 883
(1980). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1979).
3. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1979).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1979); A. CORBIN, CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 1077 (1964 & Supp. 1984).
5. See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032,
1038, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973).
6. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 430, 426 P.2d 173, 176-77, 58
Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967).
7. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
8. Id. at 433, 426 P.2d at 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18.
9. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722(1980).
10. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal.
Rptr. 551 (1985).
11. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769, 686 P.2d 1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984).
12. Id. at 752, 686 P.2d at 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
13. See Quigley v. Pet, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 889, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394, 401
(1984); Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1119, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 129
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Other courts have extended or interpreted the Seaman's decision to
cover the bad faith denial of liability under a contract.14 Each court
has offered its rationale for tortious breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. But in Wallis v. Superior Court,'15 an appel-
late court offered the only cogent criteria for confining tortious
breach.'
Developing workable criteria for awarding tortious damages for
the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is of partic-
ular concern with the California Supreme Court's recent holdings in
Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. 7 and Foley v. Interac-
tive Data Corp.' The Moradi-Shalal decision held that third parties
may no longer sue insurers under statutory provisions of the insur-
ance code, but must premise their suit on either breach of contract
or breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing contained
within that contract.' 9 Foley, without adopting criteria for awarding
tort damages in contract actions, held that employment contracts
will not give rise to tort-based damages for a breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, regardless of the standard eventually
adopted.2
This Comment will examine and critique the criteria and the stan-
dards that the California courts have offered to explain their deci-
sions. It will then offer an alternative standard, more objective and
focused, which will provide the most desirable results from both nor-
mative and economic viewpoints. This Comment will also bring an
element of cohesion, consistent with the courts' recent rulings, to this
seemingly contrary body of law.
(1984); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr.
211 (1988).
14. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1170, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820,
829 (1986); Multiplex Ins. Agency, Inc. v. California Life Ins. Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d
925, 939-40, 235 Cal. Rptr. 12, 21 (1987). Multiplex has generally not been followed by
the courts, and when it has been cited, it is most frequently criticized. See Elxsi v. Kukje
Am. Corp., 672 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
15. 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123 (1984).
16. Id. at 1119, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
17. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
18. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
19. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 304-05, 758 P.2d at 68-69, 250 Cal. Rptr. at
127.
20. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 692, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
II. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BREACH OF THE IMPLIED
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN CONTRACTS
There is implied in every contract a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.2' This covenant basically requires each contracting
party to refrain from doing anything that would prevent the other
party from receiving the benefit of the bargain. The breach of this
obligation differs from a breach of contract. Basically, the formation
of the contract obligates both parties to perform their respective
promises. Each party then has the option of either performing their
promises or paying the damages that were foreseeable. However, in
breaching the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the breaching
party attempts to avoid both performance of the promise and pay-
ment of foreseeable damages without a valid reason or defense.
The California Supreme Court initially recognized tortious breach
of good faith and fair dealing in insurance contracts. The court held
that an insurer was bound by the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to settle a claim against an insured where a possible judg-
ment could exceed the limits of the insurance policy.22 The court
reasoned that security and peace of mind were the purposes underly-
ing insurance contracts. Since the insured contracted for peace of
mind, mere contract damages could not compensate the insured for
its loss when an insurance company did not deal with third party
claims in good faith. 23 Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing was next applied where an insurance company failed to deal
with the claims of the insured in good faith. 4 The court ruled, in
these insurance cases, that the breach of good faith and fair dealing
was a tort, as well as a breach of contract, making tort remedies
available.25
Tortious breach was next extended to employment contracts. In
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,26 the appellate court found ari em-
21. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198,
200 (1958).
22. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 431-32, 426 P.2d 173, 177, 58
Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (1967). While some claim that the breach of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is first found in Comunale v. Traders & General Ins. Co., the court
there actually based its decision on contract principles and remedies. Comunale, 50 Cal.
2d at 661, 328 P.2d at 202.
23. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
24. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 575, 510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108
Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1973).
25. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 433-34, 426 P.2d at 178-79, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 18;
Gruenberg, 9 Cal. 3d at 574, 510 P.2d at 1037, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 485. In fact, Gruenberg
is the first instance where punitive damages were awarded for breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.
26. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). Cleary, who had worked
for American Airlines for 18 years, was discharged after engaging in certain union or-
ganizing activities. He filed suit for wrongful discharge and breach of an oral contract.
The trial court dismissed the actions upon defendants' demurrers. The appellate court
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ployer liable for tort damages in the breach of good faith and fair
dealing.2 7 A number of cases followed, finding the availability of tor-
tious breach in employment contracts. 28  Later, in Khanna v.
Microdata Corp.,29 and Koehrer v. Superior Court,30 the appellate
courts sorted through the numerous employment decisions, separat-
ing breach of good faith and fair dealing from tortious discharge and
simple breach of contract. Both cases identified decisions which had
been based on good faith and fair dealing, but were actually distor-
tions of tortious discharge.31 Yet, they reaffirmed the applicability of
bad faith breach to employment contracts.3 2
However, the availability of tort remedies for the breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment context
was rejected by the California Supreme Court in Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp."3 The court examined many of the criteria which had
reversed, holding that longevity of service and established public policies create an obli-
gation for the employer to terminate only for good cause, and the breach of this obliga-
tion gives rise to a valid cause of action for tortious discharge.
27. Id. at 454, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 728.
28. See, e.g., Rulon-Miller v. International Business Mach. Corp., 162 Cal. App.
3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984).
29. 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985). Khanna was discharged by
Microdata Corp. after he filed suit against the company for commissions he had been
promised in luring him away from his previous employer. He subsequently filed suit for
breach of contract, wrongful discharge and breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. A jury verdict was awarded for Khanna on all three causes of action.
The appellate court affirmed the verdict, holding that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing is breached in employment contracts when the employer engages in bad
faith action which is extraneous to the contract, frustrating the employee's beneficial
enjoyment of contract rights. Id. at 258-65, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 864-67. See infra notes 84-
85 and accompanying text.
30. 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986). The plaintiffs were dis-
charged from their jobs as apartment managers during the term of their contract. They
filed suit for breach of contract, tortious termination, and breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The actions for tortious termination and breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing were dismissed on defendant's motion for summary adjudica-
tion. The appellate court upheld the dismissal of the tortious discharge action due to
plaintiffs' failure to plead and prove that the discharge was contrary to fundamental
public policy. But, the court reversed the dismissal of the breach of good faith cause of
action, holding that plaintiffs have stated a valid cause of action where they allege that
they had fully performed all duties and conditions within the contract and that the termi-
nation was intentionally malicious and done without good cause. Id. at 1163-71, 226 Cal.
Rptr. at 824-30. See infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text.
31. Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 261, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 866; Koehrer, 181 Cal.
App. 3d at 1167, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 827. For example, Khanna and Koehrer found that
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) is
better explained as a tortious discharge case.
32. Khanna, 170 Cal. App. 3d at 262, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 867; Koehrer, 181 Cal.
App. 3d at 1169, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
33. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988); see infra notes 45-
been proffered by courts and scholars for the extension of tort dam-
ages in contract actions. Without adopting any of the proposed stan-
dards, the court held that the employment context did not "warrant
judicial extension of the proposed additional tort remedies. . .3"
Tortious breach of contract was next expanded into banking.3 5 Ini-
tially the appellate court declined to find a bank's conduct tortious, 36
but later decided that banldng contracts contained the same ele-
ments of adhesion, public policy, and fiduciary considerations found
in insurance contracts.3 The court found these elements sufficiently
analogous to insurance and awarded tort damages where a bank ex-
ercised bad faith in handling a client's claim. This decision was
based upon the court's often repeated concern for the special rela-
tionship between the contracting parties.3
The most significant extension of tort damages for the breach of
contract was expressed in Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v.
Standard Oil Co. 9 In Seaman's, the California Supreme Court held
that tortious breach of contract could extend to commercial con-
tracts where one party, in bad faith, denied the existence of a valid
contract to avoid liability.40 Since this was the first decision ex-
tending tort damages for the breach of a commercial contract, the
Seaman's decision produced a flurry of suggestions delineating crite-
ria for tortious breach of contract. Scholars41 and courts42 struggled
to balance the considerations of public policy, objective adjudication,
and essential justice in applying Seaman's. In Koehrer,43 the appel-
late court, in dicta, extended this new area of bad faith breach to
denial of liability as well as denial of the existence of the contract,
stating that the differences were virtually indiscernible."
III. FOLEY V. INTERACTIVE DATA CORP.
The supreme court's recent holding in Foley provided little guid-
ance for the availability of tort remedies for the breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing. The difficulties presented by the
53 and accompanying text.
34. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
35. Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980).
36. Id. at 32, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
37. Commercial Cotton Co. v. United Cal. Bank, 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 516, 209
Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (1985).
38. Id.
39. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
40. Id. at 767, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
41. See, e.g., Traynor, Bad Faith Breach of a Commercial Contract: A Comment
on the Seaman's Case, 8 Bus. L. NEws 1, 10-12 (1984).
42. See, e.g., Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 207 Cal. Rptr.
123 (1984).
43. 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986).
44. Id. at 1170, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing are manifested in the deci-
sion, which was delivered by a sharply divided court.4 5 Foley was
terminated when he informed his employer that his immediate su-
pervisor was under investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion for suspected embezzlement from a prior employer. Following
Foley's dismissal, he filed a suit alleging tortious discharge, breach
of an implied contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. The trial court sustained a demurrer without leave to
amend on all three causes of action, and entered judgment for Inter-
active Data Corporation, which was affirmed on appeal.46 The su-
preme court granted review in 1985, but it took nearly three years
for a decision to be rendered.47
The court examined the numerous decisions and the plethora of
scholarly criticism which had been offered on the availability of tort
damages for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing. It focused much of its analysis on the special relationship neces-
sary to impose tortious damages for the breach of good faith in em-
ployment contracts.48 However, it specifically declined to adopt any
of the proferred tests, and premised its holding on an evaluation of
the "economic dilemma that an insured faces when an insurer in bad
faith refuses to pay a claim or to accept a settlement offer within
policy limits. 49
In evaluating the "economic dilemma" faced by the terminated
employee, the court recognized that the employee, unlike the in-
sured, could mitigate the damages caused by the breach of contract
by seeking employment elsewhere.5" The court further stated that
there was a difference in the economic harms from which an insured
and an employee sought to protect themselves with their respective
45. There were three separate dissenting opinions on the availability of tort dam-
ages for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the employment
context. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 701, 765 P.2d 373, 402, 254
Cal. Rptr. 211, 240 (1988) (Broussard, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part), id.
at 715, 765 P.2d at 412, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 250 (Kaufman, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in part), id. at 723, 765 P.2d at 418, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 256 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
46. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 662, 765 P.2d at 374, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 212.
47. In fact, as recently as September 26, 1988 it was reported that there were as
many as seven separate opinions circulating among the court. Daily Journal 1:6 (Sept.
26, 1988).
48. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 690-92, 765 P.2d at 395-97, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232-34.
For a discussion of the special relationship test see infra notes 55-65 and accompanying
text.
49. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 692, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
50. Id.
contracts." Finally, it reasoned that the economic position of the in-
surer and employer were significantly different. The insurer dimin-
ishes its fiscal resources by paying even a valid claim, where the em-
ployer has an economic incentive to retain good employees.52 The
court "conclude[d] that the employment relationship is not suffi-
ciently similar to that of insurer and insured to warrant judicial ex-
tension of the proposed additional tort remedies in view of the coun-
tervailing concerns about economic policy and stability . . .
The Foley decision recognized that there are relationships suffi-
ciently similar to the insurance context to warrant the extension of
tort remedies for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Its economic analysis provides guidance for future litigators
in the form of argumentation, but it does not provide an objective
standard to evaluate the appropriateness of tort remedies for the
breach of good faith in non-employment contracts. The decision left
open both the availability of tort remedies for the breach of good
faith in all non-employment contracts, and the appropriate criteria
courts should use in evaluating the availability of those same tortious
damages.
IV. THE COURTS PROVIDE CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING BAD
FAITH BREACH OF THE COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
DEALING
A number of criteria have been offered to evaluate the appropri-
ateness of tort remedies for the breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. Since the California Supreme Court ex-
amined many of the criteria in Foley, but tacitly declined to adopt or
reject any of them, it left the issue of an appropriate standard per-
haps more clouded than ever."' Like all scholars who have ap-
proached the issue, the court sought to balance the competing inter-
ests of the injured parties on the one hand and the needs for
economic policy and stability on the other. Three major criteria have
been developed which I will call the special relationship test, the
Seaman's test, and the WaIlis test.
A. The Special Relationship Test
Bad faith breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
was initially based upon a special relationship existing between the
parties to a contract. The supreme court, in Crisci v. Security Insur-
51. Id.
52. Id. at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
53. Id.
54. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 654, 765 P.2d at 323, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
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ance Co.,55 ruled that a special relationship existed between an in-
surer and an insured since the purpose of an insurance contract was
to provide security and peace of mind.56 The court found that the
existence of the special relationship between the insured and the in-
surer made tort damages appropriate for the breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing, which is implied in every contract.57
This rationale, however, fails to answer a number of criticisms.58
First, the special relationship test focuses upon contract formation by
emphasizing the relative bargaining strength of the parties. This can
easily lead to a blurring of the distinction between unconscionability
and bad faith breach. Often the courts have resorted to distortion of
existing doctrines to support a judgment upholding basic justice.
This distortion not only clouds the underlying reason for the case at
hand,59 but also sets dangerous precedent.6 0 If the actions of the
breaching party support the decision, it is better to identify those
actions than to attribute the outcome to the posture of the parties at
the time of formation.
A second problem with the special relationship standard appears
in the assignment of contract actions. Bad faith breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing initially developed in third party
actions.6 ' Since the courts had previously ruled that contract actions
55. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
56. Id. at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19. This emphasis on the special
relationship between an insurer and its clients also assumes that all insurance transac-
tions are for peace of mind, not commercial benefit. There are a number of commercial
transactions that require insurance of one sort or another to secure beneficial treatment.
For example, in order to receive a Federal Housing Administration (F.H.A.) loan, the
borrower must buy private mortgage insurance. The borrower in this case is contracting
for insurance in order to receive the favorable interest rates available through the F.H.A.
Further, the legislature enacted California Vehicle Code sections which require all driv-
ers to have proof of financial responsibility, and essentially mandated liability insurance
for all drivers. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 16021, 16028 (West 1971 & Supp. 1988). These are
just two examples showing that insurance might be procured either for commercial ad-
vantage or from fear of prosecution. If the court is resting its analysis upon the purpose
of insurance, it should require the insured to prove that the reason for obtaining insur-
ance was primarily for security and peace of mind.
57. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
58. For a good discussion of the special relationship criteria see Comment, Recon-
structing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73
CAL. L. REV. 1291, 1298-1301 (1985); Putz & Klippen, Commercial Bad Faith: Attor-
ney Fees Not Tort Liability is the Remedy for 'Stonewalling', 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 419,
478-79 (1987).
59. See Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1163, 226 Cal. Rptr.
820, 824 (1986).
60. Cf. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARv. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) (discussing
the covert distortion of other doctrines instead of overtly recognizing unconscionability).
61. Crisci, 66 Cal. 2d at 428, 426 P.2d at 175, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
were freely assignable, the court had little trouble approving assign-
ment of bad faith breach actions to a third party. 2 However, if the
primary reason underlying the availability of tort damages in a con-
tract action is the relationship between the insurer and the insured's
peace of mind, it is a bold step to allow the random victim of an
accident to sue the insurer.6" Instead of examining the actions, dam-
ages, and positions of the parties in reliance on the contract, which
would provide a more appropriate measure for both liability and
damages, the special relationship model emphasizes the parties' rela-
tionship at the time of formation.
The California Supreme Court discussed at length this special re-
lationship test in Foley.4 The court recognized many of the inherent
problems that this test presents and declined to specifically adopt the
test, premising its analysis instead on the speculation of the result
such a test would produce "if we were to assume that the special
relationship model is an appropriate one to follow in determining
whether to expand tort recovery ... "65 Thus, the court recognized
the difficulty that judges and scholars have grappled with in the eval-
uation of tort remedies for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, based merely upon a special relationship analysis.
B. The Seaman's Test
The Seaman's decision offered two other standards for the exten-
sion of tort damages for breach of contract, one by the majority and
another by Chief Justice Bird, concurring and dissenting. The major-
ity found that the denial, in bad faith, of the existence of a valid
contract to avoid liability made tort damages available, even in com-
mercial contracts."6 This standard emanated from prior decisions
holding that neither party could do anything that would prevent the
other from receiving the benefits of the agreement.67 The majority
ruled that tort damages were appropriate because, "[s]uch conduct
goes beyond the mere breach of contract. It offends accepted notions
of business .. . 68 While at first blush this appears to benefit the
non-breaching party, this standard serves only as a trap for the un-
62. Id. at 429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 15.
63. Id.
64. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 690-92, 765 P.2d at 395-97, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 232-34.
65. Id. at 692, 765 P.2d at 395-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 233-34.
66. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 767,
686 P.2d 1158, 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984). The court did not base the tort
damages upon the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but "it is diffi-
cult otherwise to understand its repeated reference to 'good faith' and 'bad faith'...
Koehrer v. Superior Court, 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 1170, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 829
(1986).
67. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 766, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
68. Id. at 770, 686 P.2d at 1167, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
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wary in pleading.69 Ex ante this standard supplies no incentive for
the breaching party to comply with the terms of the contract. The
court reasoned that the denial of the existence of a contract in bad
faith was abhorrent to accepted business practices, yet its decision
did nothing to stop the breaching party from stipulating to the exis-
tence of a valid contract, but denying all liability under that
contract.
Chief Justice Bird, who wrote separately in Seaman's, and con-
curred in part and dissented in part, offered the second standard.
Bird argued that "[a] breach of contract may also constitute a tor-
tious breach of the convenant of good faith and fair dealing in a
situation where the possiblity that the contract will be breached is
not accepted or reasonably expected by the parties. 7 ° Under this
standard, tortious damages would be available if, at the time of for-
mation, there was an express understanding that a breach would not
be permitted, or if the parties recognized that contract damages
would either be unavailable or inadequate to compensate the injured
party.7' In attempting to extend tortious breach into the commercial
arena by this standard, Bird, much like the majority, ignored the
traditional reasoning which supported the breach of good faith and
fair dealing. Traditionally, tortious breach was granted in cases
where contracts were characterized by public interest, adhesion, and
fiduciary responsibility. One of the reasons that bad faith in these
contracts brought tort damages was that the parties in these con-
tracts typically possessed unequal bargaining power.7 2 Yet by al-
lowing the parties to come to express understandings regarding the
availability of breach and damages, the party in the superior bar-
gaining position can add recitals allowing either for contract or tort
damages in the event of a breach. Thus, the Seaman's court, in at-
tempting to extend the rationale for bad faith breach, actually of-
fered two standards that posed a trap for the unwary. The majority
offered a trap for the unwitting pleader, while Bird's snare is set for
the unwary contract draftsman. Neither standard protects the par-
69. Note in Koehrer, the appellant was careful not to deny the existence of a
valid contract. Koehrer, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 1162, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 823. For these
reasons, the second district has held that the Wallis test, discussed infra, should be ap-
plied to limit the Seaman's tort. Okun v. Morton, 203 Cal. App. 3d 805, 825-26, 250
Cal.Rptr. 220, 233 (1988).
70. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 780, 686 P.2d at 1174, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 370 (Bird,
C.J., concurring and dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1117, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123,
127 (1984).
ties that the courts traditionally sought to protect.
C. The Wallis Test
The most comprehensive standard for bad faith breach was ren-
dered in Wallis v. Superior Court."3 The appellate court required
five criteria for a tortious breach:
(1) the contract must be such that the parties are in inherently unequal
bargaining positions;(2) the motivation for entering the contract must be a non-profit motiva-
tion, i.e., to secure peace of mind, security, future protection;
(3) ordinary contract damages are not adequate because
(a) they do not require the party in the superior position to account for
its actions, and(b) they do not make the inferior party "whole";
(4) one party is especially vulnerable because of the type of harm it may
suffer and of necessity places trust in the other party to perform; and
(5) the other party is aware of this vulnerability. 74
The Wallis criteria attempt to give a sound and objective basis for
decisions. One aspect of this standard is troublesome however; the
requirement of a non-profit motivation for entering a contract is ei-
ther an assumption or a conclusion which is effective to achieve a
desired result. 5 As such, it requires the judge to evaluate a very
subjective matter, which will often be determined by the level of ab-
straction at which it is viewed.
For example, in Wallis, the plaintiff had been employed by a fur-
niture manufacturer for thirty-two years. When the firm closed its
plant a written agreement was executed, calling for the firm to pay
Wallis $568.90 per month until he reached age sixty-five. Wallis, in
exchange, promised not to compete with the firm's business. Three
years later, the company discontinued payments under the agree-
ment.7" The court, in evaluating this contract, held that, "plaintiff
entered the contract to secure financial stability and peace of
mind."1
In contrast, another court denied tort damages to an independent
trucking company in Quigley v. Pet, Inc.7 ' An independent hauler
contracted to transport nuts for Pet. The Quigley court found that,
"[t]he contractual relationship was entered into for the usual busi-
73. Id. at 1119, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
74. Id.
75. Cf. Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and the
Illusion of Legal Change, 61 MINN. L. REv. 207, 226-40 (1977) (discussing the special
relationship requirement to establish liability).
76. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d at 1113, 207 Cal. Rptr. at 125.
77. Id. at 1120, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
78. 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 891, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394, 402 (1984). While on its face
this case could be distinguished from Wallis since the contract was between two corpora-
tions, the court rejected this type of reasoning in Foley, 47 Cal. 3d 654, 692-93, 765 P.2d
373, 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 234 (1988).
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ness reason of profit."7 9 While there are some differences in being
paid for a covenant not to compete, and a contract to haul nuts, it
does not seem consistent to find that one party sought security while
the other pursued commercial advantage. Both parties entered into
their contracts to receive assurance that their performance would
trigger the responsibility of a corporation to pay money. The differ-
ence in the treatment of these cases is more properly explained by
the vulnerability created by non-simultaneous performance. Wallis
was asked to give up his livelihood in exchange for monthly pay-
ments made over ten years. Quigley, on the other hand, contracted
to haul walnuts, in exchange for regular payments.
Another case which demonstrates the subjective nature of the
Wallis non-profit criteria is Bodenhamer v. Superior Court.80 In
Bodenhamer, a jeweler purchased insurance to protect his business.
When he submitted a claim, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.
prolonged the processing. The court found that if St. Paul breached
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, an award of tort dam-
ages for the ruin of the jeweler's good business name would be avail-
able on remand."' Under the Wallis criteria, this claim would not
have been allowed because Bodenhamer's purpose in securing insur-
ance was to protect a mere commercial interest.
A second problem with the Wallis criteria is the requirement of
unequal bargaining power. This standard evolved from the special
relationship standard discussed earlier.8 2 Like special relationships,
the unequal bargaining power requirement focuses upon the time of
contract formation. An action for bad faith tortious breach should
focus not on formation, but on those actions and situations where the
conduct of the breaching party is sufficiently grievous to warrant tor-
tious damages. Curiously, one court has found that the party weaker
at the time of formation is in a superior position to pursue a suit for
breach of contract.8 3
A greater problem with the Wallis criteria is that it fails to ac-
count for a number of decisions that the courts have rendered. In
Khanna v. Microdata Corp., 4 the plaintiff was lured away from a
79. Quigley, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 893, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
80. 192 Cal. App. 3d 1472, 238 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1987).
81. Id. at 1475, 238 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
82. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
83. It found that "litigation ... against a financially formidable opponent...
assured plaintiffs a full recovery of any contract judgment." Quigley, 162 Cal. App. 3d
at 893, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
84. 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985).
lucrative position to accept a job with Microdata. He was attracted
by the promise of a very profitable account. After changing employ-
ers, however, Microdata tried to alter the terms of the agreement.
When Khanna filed suit to recover the benefits of his agreement,
Microdata fired him. The court found sufficient evidence to warrant
a finding of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.8 5 Under the Wallis criteria, the court must find that the
purpose of the contract was not for profit. While a judge might be
willing to analogize an employment contract to a contract for early
retirement, the facts leave little doubt that Khanna's purpose in se-
curing the contract was to profit from the lucrative account that he
was promised.
Another decision that poses problems for the Wallis criteria is
Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank.86 This was the
first case in California which extended tortious breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing into the banking contract. In
Commercial Cotton, Travis Calvin, the principal shareholder of
Commercial Cotton Co., did not discover, for nearly two years, that
a $4,000 forged check was charged against his account. When Cal-
vin discovered that the check was negligently paid against his ac-
count, he notified the bank and asked it to return the money. The
bank refused to reimburse Calvin, stating that the claim was barred
by a one-year statute of limitations, despite the fact that eleven days
earlier United California Bank had lost a case on that very point.8 7
The court awarded punitive damages to Calvin even though no phys-
ical or emotional damages could be shown. 88 The court specifically
found in this case that the plaintiff contracted with the bank for se-
curity and ease of transactions. Because the account was a non-inter-
est bearing checking account, the court held that no profit motive
was present."' On its face, this case meets the Wallis criteria. How-
ever, if the bank dealt in exactly the same manner with another de-
positor, but the problems arose in an interest bearing account, the
extended damages available under Commercial Cotton would not be
available to them.90
85. Id. at 264, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
86. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985).
87. Id. at 515, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 553 (citing Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal.
Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978)).
88. The court in fact overturned damages for emotional distress which had been
awarded at trial since no proof was offered indicating that the emotional distress was
severe or substantial. Id. at 517, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 555.
89. See id.
90. The problems stemming from an interest bearing account could cause actual
provable tort damages which the injured party could recognize in much less than two
years, unlike Commercial Cotton (where it took Calvin over two years to discover his
loss), yet not have these tort damages available to them because of a mere five percent
interest payment.
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Most importantly, the Wallis criteria fail to explain the very deci-
sion they were based upon, Seaman's.91 The plaintiff in Seaman's
negotiated a requirements contract with Standard Oil, so it could
qualify to lease a marine fueling station. Once Seaman's entered the
lease in reliance upon the negotiated contract, Standard Oil refused
to comply with the terms, denying the existence of a contract. While
the court in Seaman's claimed not to base its decision on good faith
and fair dealing, much discussion was devoted to the concept. 92
Under the Wallis criteria, Seaman's would have been unable to re-
cover tort damages because the primary purpose of its contract was
to establish a profitable business. The Wallis criteria could only be
met by arguing that the purpose of the contract was security regard-
ing the availability of fuel. However, this argument illustrates the
subjective nature of this standard, for every contract at some level of
abstraction is concerned with security.
Both the non-profit standard and the unequal bargaining criteria,
as shown in the cases above, present subjective terms which the
judge is allowed to mold to accomplish basic justice. One of the
themes of modern contract law is the move towards objective adjudi-
cation. 93 Objective standards promote certainty both for the case at
hand and as precedent for future decisions. Therefore, a more objec-
tive standard for bad faith breach is desirable.
V. THE DELAYED PERFORMANCE STANDARD
This Comment proposes an alternative standard for the evaluation
of tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. This standard, called the delayed performance standard, has
four criteria for a tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing:
(1) there must be a binding contract calling for non-simultaneous
performance;
(2) the performing party, relying upon the terms of the contract,
must fully perform or so substantially perform that it leaves that
party in an absolutely vulnerable position;
91. Wallis, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1116, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 127 (1984) (hold-
ing that the plaintiff was in a position sharing similar characteristics to insurance con-
tracts, as was "intimated" in Seaman's v. Direct Buying Serv. Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,
36 Cal. 3d 752, 769, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984)).
92. See supra note 66.
93. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 106 (1964 & Supp. 1984) (discuss-
ing the rise of the objective theory of contracts).
(3) the performing party must be left without adequate self-help
or contract remedies, in the event of breach; and
(4) the breaching party, in bad faith94 and aware of the vulnera-
bility and the inadequacy of remedies, adopts a "stonewall" or "see
you in court" position.
A. A Binding Contract
Tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing should require the existence of a binding contract. The
courts have often stated that this covenant is implied in law in every
agreement,95 though not a part of the actual agreement. Good faith
and fair dealing is implied to assure that neither party to an agree-
ment will interfere with the other's right to receive the benefits of
that agreement.96 The supreme court has stated that it is possible for
the parties to shape the nature and context of this covenant, though
no party can exclude it from any agreement.97 With the advent of
promissory estoppel98 and U.C.C. gap-filling provisions,99 there are
currently sufficient protections for a party which has substantially
negotiated a contract, and for a party which has extensively relied
upon representations during negotiations. 10 By restricting this im-
plied covenant to binding contracts, the courts can preserve the right
of the parties each to consent to the duty and to have an opportunity
to mold the duty to deal fairly with one another. Furthermore, this
requirement will provide an economy of action by limiting litigation
to parties that were privy to the contract.101
94. This Comment does not propose to examine the exact criteria for bad faith.
For the purpose of this Comment, bad faith exists when a party to the contract does not
have reasonable belief in or reasonable grounds for asserting a claim. For a good discus-
sion of bad faith, see Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968); Summers, The
General Duty of Good Faith - Its Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L.
REV. 810 (1982). But see Burton, More of a Good Faith Performance of Contract: A
Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REv. 497 (1984).
95. See, e.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 429, 426 P.2d 173, 176,
58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (1967).
96. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328 P.2d 198,
200 (1958).
97. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 769,
686 P.2d 1158, 1166, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 363 (1984).
98. Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 51 Cal. 2d 409, 413, 333 P.2d 757, 759 (1958).
99. See, e.g., CAL. COM. CODE §§ 1204, 2305 & 2308 (West 1964 & Supp.
1988).
100. But see Comment, Reconstructing Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing as a Tort, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1291, 1316-18 (1985) (stating that
the tort of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing should replace promis-
sory estoppel).
101. Cf. Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 46 Cal. 3d 287, 301, 758 P.2d
58, 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116, 124 (1988) (discussing the plethora of litigation spawned by
allowing third parties to sue under the California Insurance Code).
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The requirement of a binding contract is not a supplement to the
statute of frauds. Courts have long recognized the validity of both
oral and implied-in-fact contracts." 2 Likewise considerable scholar-
ship has been expended by the courts 03 and scholars'0 in elucidat-
ing the factors necessary to find a binding contract, whether written,
oral, or implied. For the purposes of the delayed performance stan-
dard, a binding contract is an agreement containing all legal require-
ments, between two parties with sufficient particularity to indicate
that a reasonable person would conclude that an enforceable con-
tract has been formed.
B. Non-simultaneous Performance
Tort damages are particularly appropriate for contracts that call
for non-simultaneous performance, since the courts have treated
such contracts quite differently. The courts have refused to apply
anticipatory breach, thereby accelerating payment, where one party
has fully performed and merely awaits payment in money.0 5 Ac-
cording to the courts' reasoning, the parties bargained for their own
deal, and therefore the courts will not accelerate the payment called
for under the contract. Also, the courts, recognizing the vulnerability
of non-simultaneous performance, have refused to specifically en-
force a contract against a party required by the contract to perform
first, absent adequate security for counter-performance. 0 6 On the
one hand, self-help is no longer available to the party who has fully
performed, 10 7 yet the courts will not allow that party to sue for per-
formance not yet due. The party who has fully performed is left to
await the possibility of further legal proceedings. On the other hand,
the courts will not allow the party who has fully performed to sue for
specific enforcement in contracts calling for non-simultaneous per-
formance where there is inadequate security for that party's protec-
tion. These two differences demonstrate the courts' recognition of the
need for such contracts, but the inherent vulnerability which they
102. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 675-82, 765 P.2d 373, 383-
88, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211, 221-26 (1988).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV.
335 (1974).
105. Minor v. Minor, 184 Cal. App. 2d 118, 122, 7 Cal. Rptr. 455, 457 (1960).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 363 (1979).
107. Self-help is a term used to indicate those remedies available to an early per-
forming party, without resorting to court action. Such remedies include mitigation, with-
holding counter performance, and the U.C.C. concept of cover.
produce.
This vulnerability has concerned the courts in many of the good
faith and fair dealing cases, however, it has never been adequately
defined. 10 8 It has at least impliedly been an extension of the special
relationship standard.109 However, in each of these good faith and
fair dealing cases, this vulnerability has been molded to fit the sub-
stantial justice desired in the individual situation." 0 Yet, in each of
the cases where the requisite vulnerability was found, the contract
called for non-simultaneous performance. For the purposes of the
proposed standard, full performance and substantial peformance
both satisfy this requirement for vulnerability."' This definition of
vulnerability focuses on the positions and the acts of the parties at
the time of breach, not at the time the contract was formed.
C. Inadequate Remedy
Under the delayed peformance standard, tort damages would only
be available where contract remedies are inadequate, self-help is un-
available, and both parties are aware of this situation. A thorough
understanding of these criteria eliminates many of the concerns that
followed the extension of tort damages into commercial contracts." 2
In a contract between two commercial parties, contract damages will
normally be adequate to compensate the injured party. Traditional
contract damages give the injured party money damages plus inter-
est sufficient to put that party in the position they would have been
in had the contract been fulfilled." 3 Most commercial parties diver-
108. See, e.g., Wallis v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 1109, 1120, 207 Cal.
Rptr. 123, 129 (1984) (vulnerability is stated as a requirement but then never fully in-
vestigated though factors were available that would have made such an evaluation en-
lightening). See also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d at 692, 765 P.2d at 396,
254 Cal. Rptr. at 234 (in evaluating the possibility of a special relationship the court
described the predicament of the insured as an economic dilemma).
109. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.,, 36 Cal. 3d 752, 768,
686 P.2d 1158, 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354, 362 (1984).
110. Compare the difference in treatment of two corporations in Quigley v. Pet,
Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1984) and Seaman's Direct Buying
Serv. Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 173, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984).
111. Substantial performance is a concept that has already been employed in con-
tract law, often to avoid gamesmanship. Posner v. Grunwald-Marx, 56 Cal. 2d 169, 186,
363 P.2d 313, 323, 14 Cal. Rptr. 297, 308 (1961).
112. See, e.g., Hayes, Punitive Damages in Breach of Contract Actions: An Analy-
sis of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 7 NORTHROP U. L.J.
AEROSPACE Bus. & TAX'N 67 (1986).
113. There has been a suggestion to award attorney's fees in all of these cases as
well, Note, "Contort". Tortious Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing in Noninsurance, Commercial Contracts - Its Existence and Desirability, 60
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 510, 527-28 (1985). However, at present, all parties have the right
to negotiate the attorney's fees provisions in any contract they draft, so each party al-
ready has at their disposal the ability to protect themselves against the costs of litigation.
Furthermore, this approach would increase the transaction costs inherent in contract dis-
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sify their dealings to avoid total vulnerability 114 But in those busi-
nesses where diversification is not possible or efficient, the extension
of tort damages will not thwart the agreements of commercial par-
ties. Instead the parties merely will be forced to internalize the costs
of breach7rm
VI. APPLYING THE DELAYED PERFORMANCE TEST
A. The Insurance Context
The delayed performance standard explains prior court decisions
better than the alternative criteria presented by courts and scholars.
Few contracts require people to fully perform without any security
guaranteeing counter-performance. But insurance contracts, by their
very nature, require that the insured fully perform by paying all pre-
miums while awaiting counter-performance in the event of a claim.
The special relationship model relied upon the purpose of insurance
to justify tort damages in insurance contract cases. This rationale
has already been shown to create difficulties. 6 The delayed per-
formance standard does not pose these same difficulties. For one
thing, there is no need to prove the reason for the purchase of
insurance.
The bad faith breach of an insurance contract meets all of the
requirements under the proposed criteria of the delayed performance
standard. Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. 1 7 illustrates this proposi-
tion. In this case, a binding contract called for non-simultaneous per-
formance. The contract called for Crisci to fully pay all premiums on
the required dates. In turn, Security Insurance agreed to defend
Crisci against all lawsuits and any claims up to the agreed upon pol-
icy limit. Security Insurance was aware of the trust that Crisci
placed in them, yet refused in bad faith both to defend a subsequent
suit and to settle a claim against her within the policy limits. This
left Crisci with no available self-help. Crisci could neither settle on
putes. These increased transaction costs then will force a party to include these costs in
evaluating the efficiency of a breach. Such a change could lead to a decrease in the
efficiency of the allocation of resources without requiring any evaluation of the egregious-
ness of the actions of the breaching party.
114. Total vulnerability, as used in this Comment, exists when one party to a con-
tract has available no self-help remedies and the traditional contract remedies provide no
protection against injuries and damages arising out of the posture and the actions of the
breaching party at the time of breach.
115. See infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
117. 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
her own due to her lack of resources, nor stop payment for all the
premiums already paid. As a result, a jury verdict far in excess of
the policy limits was awarded against Crisci. Therefore, her contract
damages, full payment under the policy, would not put her in the
position she would have been in had Security Insurance fully per-
formed under the agreement. 118 Security Insurance knew the insured
did not have adequate means to pay the settlement prior to trial, and
therefore was aware of both the vulnerability and the unavailability
of adequate remedies. Yet, it clung to its bad faith premise that it
had no liability under the policy. Thus, each of the elements of
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the
delayed performance standard is fully satisfied in Crisci.
Since the delayed performance standard does not rely upon special
relationship to explain tort remedies, the assignment of causes of ac-
tion is more understandably allowed. The court in Crisci allowed an
assignment of the cause of action even though damages were pre-
mised upon the loss of peace of mind. 119 A random accident victim
cannot claim to have contracted for peace of mind with an insurance
carrier he has never met. Yet, under older standards, that same per-
son can sue to receive compensation for someone else's loss of peace
of mind. The proposed standard is much more straightforward. The
accident victim can sue, not for another's peace of mind, but for the
damages commensurate with actual damages suffered due to the
breach of contract.
The delayed performance standard also explains the supreme
court's recent decision in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Insur-
ance Cos.'20 In this case, the California Supreme Court overruled a
prior holding in Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Superior Court",,
which allowed third parties to bring bad faith actions against insur-
ers based upon California Insurance Code section 790.03.122 The
court stated that the Royal Globe decision "promotes multiple litiga-
tion, because its holding contemplates, indeed encourages, two law-
suits by the injured claimant."12 3 Furthermore, because Royal Globe
did not require the existence of a binding insurance contract between
the claimant and the insurer, the court stated that the claimant's
ability to simultaneously sue both the insurer and the insured en-
courages unwarranted settlement demands.'24 Under the delayed
performance standard, such third party bad faith actions would not
118. Id. at 428-29, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
119. Id. at 434, 426 P.2d at 179, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
120. 46 Cal. 3d 287, 758 P.2d 58, 250 Cal. Rptr. 116 (1988).
121. 23 Cal. 3d 880, 592 P.2d 329, 153 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1979).
122. CAL. INS. CODE § 790 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988).
123. Moradi-Shalal, 46 Cal. 3d at 301, 758 P.2d at 66, 250 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
124. Id.
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be allowable, because the standard requires a binding contract be-
tween the claimant and the insurer.
B. The Banking Context
The delayed performance standard likewise provides a better ra-
tionale for extending the tortious breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing into the banking context, as shown in Com-
mercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank.125 Calvin created a
binding contract with United California Bank. This contract called
for Calvin to deposit money in the bank, while the bank would hold
that money and make it available to him later, upon demand. The
bank honored a forged check, then in bad faith denied any responsi-
bility, having no reasonable basis for their denial. 26 Calvin was left
with no self-help remedies. Further, when the bank adopted a "see
you in court" posture, Calvin was left only with the recourse of pur-
suing lengthy legal proceedings to recover what was rightfully his,
even though he had notified the bank of his position and his lack of
adequate remedies.1 27 The focus should have been on the positions of
the parties at the time of the breach and the actions and bad faith
displayed by the bank. Furthermore, under the proposed standard,
there would be no difference in the treatment of depositors in inter-
est bearing versus non-interest bearing accounts. 128
C. Seaman's and Quigley - The Commercial Context
The delayed performance standard applies equally to the Sea-
man's decision.129 The court found that Standard Oil's letter of in-
tent to supply fuel oil was sufficient to form a specifically enforceable
contract. Standard in turn knew that Seaman's was using this con-
tract as the basis for a bid on a marine fueling station. Standard Oil
further required Seaman's to seek and receive exceptions to the gov-
ernmentally imposed fuel allocations, when the government later
placed limitations upon the expansion of fuel distribution. Seaman's,
125. 163 Cal. App. 3d 511, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551 (1985). See also supra notes 86-90
and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
127. Commercial Cotton, 163 Cal. App. 3d at 518, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 556. The
court awarded punitive damages in this case even though it overturned the damages for
emotional distress awarded by the trial court. In this case, the contract damages were
inadequate compensation for the misconduct of the bank.
128. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
129. 36 Cal. 3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 206 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1984). See also supra
notes 39-42, 66-72 and accompanying text.
at each step, fully performed all the requisite terms of the contract
and awaited Standard Oil's counter-performance. Not only did Stan-
dard Oil refuse to comply with the contract once these exceptions
were granted, but it then asked the Federal Energy Commission to
repeal the exception. Because of the unique situations in the petro-
leum industry at the time, Seaman's was left with no alternative
source of fuel. Standard Oil, aware of this fact, refused to honor the
contract, and in bad faith denied its existence altogether. This left
Seaman's with no self-help remedies and inadequate legal remedies
under the contract. 30
The delayed performance standard also explains the denial of tort
damages in Quigley v. Pet, Inc.13 1 Despite the existence of a binding
contract, Pet refused to comply. While there was a decided differ-
ence in the relative size of the parties to the contract, the court de-
clined to find a tortious breach of good faith and fair dealing. Since
the price was favorable to Quigley, the court reasoned that he must
have assumed the risk of breach. l 2 In other areas of contract law,
courts have consistently declined to review the adequacy of consider-
ation. 33 Yet here, the court, at least partially, based its decision
upon the amount of the contract price. If the contract price is to
become a consideration for the granting of tort damages in contract
actions, judges will have to display great wisdom in the appropriate
relative value of all contracts. A much better analysis would show
that Quigley had available to him self-help and contract remedies.
Quigley was not in an absolutely vulnerable position, because he still
had possession of his trucks and could seek business elsewhere to
mitigate damages. If under other contracts, he did not receive the
full contract price agreed to by Pet, he still retained the right to sue
for the money difference.
D. The Employment Context
Koehrer v. Superior Court134 demonstrates the proposed standard
in the employment context. The Koehrers were suing their employers
for breach of contract and the breach of good faith and fair dealing.
The court carefully analyzed the history of breach of contract, tor-
tious discharge, and breach of good faith and fair dealing. The court
found that breach of contract suits were based upon the violation of
an express or implied contract term. Next, it stated that tortious dis-
charge occurred when an employer discharged an employee contrary
130. Seaman's, 36 Cal. 3d at 761-62, 686 P.2d at 1162, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
131. 162 Cal. App. 3d 877, 208 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1984).
132. Id. at 893, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
133. Horton v. Kyburz, 53 Cal. 2d 59, 65, 346 P.2d 399, 403 (1959).
134. 181 Cal. App. 3d 1155, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986).
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to public policy expressed by either the legislature or the judiciary.
Finally, the court stated that the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is breached when an employer discharges an employee, and
claims in bad faith that a good cause for discharge exists.135 In its
analysis, the court claimed that a number of previous decisions
which were based on the breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing were, in reality, tortious discharge claims. 136
Under the delayed performance standard, the Koehrers would
have had the self-help remedy of seeking employment elsewhere.
This would have made tort remedies under the employment contract
unavailable. This result would have been consistent with both the
court's rationale and holding in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. 3'
Instead, "[b]y this broad stroke, made without analyzing the appro-
priateness of imposing tort remedies in the employment context, the
Koehrer court broached the possibility of obtaining tort damages for
the breach of any term of a contract whether for employment or
otherwise." ' 8
The Koehrer court failed to explain how an employer can breach
an employment contract without also breaching good faith and fair
dealing."3 9 The employer cannot deny the existence of a valid con-
tract or the employer will run afoul of Seaman's. Neither can the
employer deny liability without good cause or "an action for breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing will lie.' 40 It
seems that according to Koehrer, there are only two limited areas in
which employers can breach an employment contract without sub-jecting themselves to tortious damages. First, in the event that the
employer asserted a good faith claim which is proven to be false, the
breach might be limited to contract damages.' Second, if an em-
135. Id. at 1163-71, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 824-29.
136. Id. at 1167-68, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 827 (citing Cleary v. American Airlines,
Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980)).
137. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988). See also supra
notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
138. Id. at 689, 765 P.2d at 393, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
139. See Elxsi v. Kukje America Corp., 672 F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1987)(discussing the conceptual flaws of this approach to the definition of the breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
140. Koehrer, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 1171, 226 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
141. One of the few manners in which this might occur would be in a situation
similar to Ketchu v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1596, 231 Cal. App. 581(1986). In this case an employee failed to assert that he hit another employee in self-
defense until the dispute went to trial. Had the employee asserted self-defense prior to
trial, the court would likely find that the failure of an employer to properly ascertain the
veracity of the cause for termination in itself would be a breach of the covenant of good
ployer discharges an employee with absolutely no reasons or claims,
as absurd as it may be, they might be able to avoid tort damages. 42
Adopting the Koehrer standard appears to greatly benefit the em-
ployee. However, such a policy would not benefit employees as a
class. If employers realized breach of contract subjects them to dam-
ages in excess of the contract amount, they would be forced to
change their business practices. First, employers might decide that it
is not in their interests to offer contracts to any of their employees at
all. Thus, the security enjoyed by contract employees might be en-
dangered. 43 Second, employers may also significantly limit the
length of contract in an attempt to lessen exposure to tort damages.
This could disrupt the stability that is provided by long-term con-
tracts.' More likely, wages would be lessened for all contract em-
ployees to absorb the cost of increased damages paid out in the event
of a claim.
If the delayed performance standard is adopted, many of these
problems would be eliminated. First of all, the delayed performance
standard will not alter the availability of claims for tortious dis-
charge. The Koehrer court itself found that a number of prior cases
based upon good faith and fair dealing were actually tortious dis-
charge.145 Khanna v. Microdata.46 provides a good example of an
employee having a valid tortious breach of good faith and fair deal-
ing claim under the delayed performance standard. Not only did
faith and fair dealing.
142. These factors are greatly amplified by the unique characteristics of labor law.
First of all, employees have a limited duty to mitigate damages in the event of a breach.
See Parker v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 Cal. 3d 176, 187, 474 P.2d 689, 696,
89 Cal. Rptr. 737, 744 (1970) (Sullivan, C.J., dissenting). Not only can discharged em-
ployees avoid mitigation, but all money paid to them under unemployment insurance
cannot be used to mitigate damages. Billetter v. Posell, 94 Cal. App. 2d 858, 211 P.2d
621 (1947). Therefore, a terminated employee under Koehrer can collect unemployment,
reject job offers that are not satisfactory, and still collect not only the face value of the
contract, but also tort damages as well. This is combined with the protections offered
under California Labor Code which provides in part for penalties, attorneys' fees in suc-
cessful labor actions, continued obligation for wages when not paid at discharge, and that
the Labor Commissioner is required to bring such actions on behalf of employees. CAL.
LAD, CODE §§ 203-218.5 (West 1971 & Supp. 1988). All of these factors combine to put
the employer at a certain disadvantage.
143. Though Pugh found that the remedies available to employees at will are not
completely limited. Pugh v. See's Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917
(1981).
144. Cf. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power, 26 U. To-
RONTO L.J. 359 (1976) (discussing the effects that substantive unconscionability will
have on the market power of employees).
145. See supra note 30. Another good example is found in Rulon-Miller v. Inter-
national Business Machs. Corp., 162 Cal. App. 3d 241, 208 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1984). In
that case, the court questioned why there was no investigation into the tortious invasion
of privacy even though the decision was based upon the breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
146. 170 Cal. App. 3d 250, 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985).
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Microdata change the employment contract, they refused to pay ac-
cording to the terms of their new contract. Therefore, when Khanna
sued, his employer still owed him for work that was fully performed,
and Khanna was left with no self-help remedies. If Khanna could
demonstrate that contract remedies were inadequate, his full per-
formance coupled with Microdata's knowledge of his vulnerability
makes tort damages available under the proposed standard. In this
manner an employer can prevent an employee from receiving the
benefits of an agreement. Where the employee is forced to sue both
for work fully performed under the contract as well as for the future
benefits of that contract, the employee is left without the self-help
remedy of mitigation, for the benefits of the contract have already
been conferred upon the employer.
The Foley decision foreclosed the availability of tort remedies for
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment
contracts. 147 However, its analysis focused upon the economic di-
lemma faced by the insured when an insurer refuses to accept a set-
tlement offer within the policy limits. The court reasoned that, "the
insured cannot turn to the marketplace to find another insurance
company willing to pay for the loss already incurred."1 '8 Likewise,
the discharged employee, who has not been paid for services already
rendered, cannot turn to the market place and find an employer will-
ing to pay for the work performed for another. While the discharged
employee has not purchased protection from his former employer,
there is a fundamental difference in the position of an employee
seeking the promised payment for services already rendered.'49
The court found a difference between the insurance relationship
and the employment relationship, which is not present when an em-
ployee is seeking payment for benefits already conferred. Typically
an insurer and an insured "are financially at odds. If the insurer
pays a claim it diminishes its fiscal resources ."' But, "as a general
rule it is to the employer's economic benefit to retain good employ-
ees," 5' so the "interest of employer and employee are most fre-
147. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 693, 765 P.2d 373, 396, 254
Cal. Rptr. 211, 234 (1988).
148. Id. at 692, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
149. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 203 (West 1971 & Supp. 1989) (providing that an
employee's wages will continue after discharge, where an employer refuses to pay wages
upon discharge).
150. Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 693, 765 P.2d at 396, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234.
151. Id.
quently in alignment. '1 52 This reasoning breaks down when the em-
ployee has already been discharged and the employer is withholding
payment of back wages. In this instance, once again, the employee is
cast in an economic dilemma where he or she must convince the em-
ployer to diminish its fiscal resources without any concommitant eco-
nomic benefit. Therefore, while the Foley court did not address this
particular issue, its analysis reasonably supports the availability of
tort remedies where an employee has been discharged, and the em-
ployer withholds wages for work already performed.
E. Economic Analysis
Economic analysis also supports the delayed performance stan-
dard. One of the functions of contract law is to provide for an effi-
cient allocation of resources. 153 This is one reason that courts have
been reluctant to impose damages greater than the limits of a con-
tract. Such limitation allows efficient breach. An efficient breach oc-
curs when one party is prepared to fully compensate the other party
so that the breaching party may accept a superior offer elsewhere.
Under the delayed performance standard, efficient breaches are still
available, since a tortious breach cannot occur without the breaching
party refusing to compensate the performing party. In fact, the very
concept of efficient breach is antithetical to such an opportunistic
exploitation of a vulnerable party. In the event that a contract calls
for non-simultaneous performance, once one party has fully per-
formed no efficient breach can occur. Instead the non-performing
party is exploiting the other's vulnerability.'5 So, by adopting the
delayed performance standard, efficient breaches are not thwarted,
only opportunism is discouraged.
This standard also eliminates a great deal of gamesmanship. It
puts both parties in a position where performance pursuant to the
contract is to their greatest advantage. For the early performing
party, compliance with the express terms of the contract is essential.
The performing party is aware that any deviation from the terms of
the contract gives rise to a good faith claim on the part of the
breaching party. On the other hand, the later performing party
knows that mental suffering, extended consequences, and punitive
damages are possibly available if he or she tries to exploit the vulner-
able position of the early performing party. Further, ex ante notice is
provided to both parties of the exact criteria which will be utilized to
establish tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing in their contract.
152. Id.
153. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.1 (3d ed. 1986).
154. Id. This is what Posner calls opportunistic breach.
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Adopting this standard will not encourage early performers to
leave themselves totally vulnerable. Common business sense induces
every person to seek security in their agreements. It is highly un-
likely that anyone will situate themselves vulnerably in order to re-
ceive tortious damages.15 On the other hand, this standard takes
away some of the desirability of being the late performing party, for
under this standard, the late performing party will be the only one
subject to tort damages for the breach of good faith and fair dealing.
Therefore, he or she will know that if he or she does in fact breach
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, he oi she will be liable
for extended consequences, mental suffering, and possibly punitive
damages.
Neither will this standard promote a large number of exorbitant
or fraudulent claims. First, in order to show a valid claim the early
performing party must prove that he or she has been damaged. Also,
many of the concerns regarding damages in commercial contracts
are unfounded.' Further, punitive damages are only available when
fraud, oppression, or malice are found.157 These limitations confine
tort damages for the breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to instances of genuine injury.
Finally, this standard both reduces the cost of information, and
internalizes the costs of breach. The delayed performance standard
requires that the breaching party know both of the vulnerability of
the other party and of the inadequacy of his or her remedies. This
compels the performing party to disclose his or her position. The
party must disclose both the extent of his or her injuries as a result
of the breach, and the full extent of the claim. 58 This allows the
breaching party to evaluate the full potential cost of breach. In the
155. For example, in order to receive punitive damages, the plaintiff must prove
"by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression,
fraud, or malice .. " CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West 1970 & Supp. 1988).
156. For example, if two large commercial firms entered into a contract calling for
non-simultaneous performance, traditional contract law would provide for the contract
price plus accrued interest. Under the delayed standard, the only addition to these dam-
ages will be provable consequential damages. Such damages are not likely to arise be-
tween relatively equal commercial counterparts. However, in cases such as Seaman's,
where those damages do in fact occur, provable consequential damages would be
available.
157. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988).
158. Such disclosures could have prevented the claim found in Ketchu v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 195 Cal. App. 3d 1596, 231 Cal. Rptr. 581 (1986). In Ketchu, a long-
term employee was fired for striking a fellow worker. At trial, he alleged for the first
time that he struck the other man in self-defense. If this allegation had been included in
any of the reports of the incident, perhaps the dispute could have been avoided.
event that the breach does in fact meet all the elements, the breach-
ing party will then know the full cost of that breach. With this infor-
mation, the breaching party will be able to weigh the cost of breach
against the validity of any defense which he or she plans to assert, in
order to make the most economically efficient decision. The party in
the best position to know of the validity of any defense, the breach-
ing party, will receive the information needed to fully evaluate all
the potential costs of asserting defenses in bad faith.
VII. CONCLUSION
California courts have extended tortious breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing beyond the rationale they initially pro-
vided to support it. The standards offered by the courts are not con-
sistent with the decisions which they have produced. These criteria
offer no certainty for adjudication or precedential decisions. Quite
the contrary, the law has been in a state of confusion on this issue.
The delayed performance standard proposed by this Comment of-
fers effective criteria for the evaluation of the breach of the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. The proposed standard is based upon
normative considerations of basic justice, economic concerns of effi-
cient allocation, and pragmatic interests of adjudicative certainty.
This standard emanates from a commonality which underlies the
previous California decisions: non-simultaneous performance. While
these prior decisions were based upon subjective criteria, the delayed
performance standard explains these same decisions in an objective
fashion. By utilizing legal concepts already employed in contract
law, the proposed standard replaces the uncertainty currently sur-
rounding breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing with
a predictability which will encourage consistent litigation. The
delayed performance standard will not deter contract formation, but
instead will promote efficient transactions allowing efficient breaches,
and provide a means for the parties to structure the contract to avoid
tort damages. Yet, most importantly, it will provide a standard by
which injured parties can receive adequate compensation, without
promoting fraudulent claims.
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